Merits Review
Each term the United States Supreme Court issues a number of decisions that materially impact the legal landscape for our clients. But which cases are likely to have relevant impacts on your business? And what might the ramifications for your business be? In this series, Quarles attorneys will highlight the key cases in the current term that merit your review. Use our pre-term previews of these cases to identify which ones to watch, then come back for key updates as these cases develop throughout the term.
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Relevant to employers who sponsor 401(k)s and the fiduciaries who manage them.
Oral Argument Analysis
On October 6, the Supreme Court held oral argument in Anderson v. Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee, No. 25-498. The case arises under ERISA’s duty of prudence. Petitioners’ theory is that Intel’s fiduciaries overallocated the plan’s target-date funds and a global diversified fund to hedge funds and private equity. Intel answered that it adopted that approach to reduce exposure to losses, at the acknowledged expense of some potential upside. The core issue in this case, as Justice Gorsuch paraphrased it, is whether, “for claims predicated on fund underperformance, a meaningful benchmark is required.” The U.S. Department of Labor recently included the following definition of “meaningful benchmark” in a proposed ERISA safe harbor for investment funds that include alternative assets, like hedge funds and private equity investments: “an investment, strategy, index, or other comparator that has similar mandates, strategies, objectives, and risks to the designed investment alternative.”[1]
Petitioners argued that ERISA’s duty of prudence is “inherently flexible” and that the Court has consistently declined to impose judicially crafted bright-line rules at the pleading stage. In their view, the Ninth Circuit’s “meaningful benchmark requirement” is such a rule because it requires a complaint to identify a virtually indistinguishable fund that performed better, failing which the performance allegations are discarded. That approach, petitioners argued, conflicts with Twombly and Iqbal, which require courts to assess all non-conclusory allegations together, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Respondents answered that much of Petitioners’ argument had little to do with the question presented, arguing that ERISA permits fiduciaries a wide range of prudent decisions, including the choice of a more conservative strategy. On the pleading question, Respondent argued that a performance gap alone does not plausibly suggest wrongdoing, because the obvious alternative explanation is that different funds are designed to perform differently. Respondent noted that the Court regularly draws clear lines at the pleading stage, as it did in Twombly, Dudenhoeffer, and Hikma.[2]
The United States supported Respondents, contending that to support an inference of imprudent implementation, Petitioners must compare Intel’s funds to funds with similar objectives.
Most of the justices seemed skeptical of Petitioners’ position. Justice Thomas opened by asking whether Petitioners were claiming that imprudence could be shown by comparing dissimilar funds, summarizing the Ninth Circuit’s point as “you can’t compare apples and oranges.” Petitioners agreed, but noted the real question is what counts as an apple and what counts as an orange. That metaphor framed much of the remaining argument.
Justice Gorsuch repeatedly returned Petitioners to the question presented. He asked whether Petitioners were shifting ground by effectively conceding that apples must be compared to apples while emphasizing the rest of the complaint. Justice Alito noted that Petitioners’ brief focused heavily on criticizing the investment strategy, which he said sounded like a challenge to strategy rather than underperformance. He also questioned how the strategy and underperformance arguments fit together under a “holistic” approach. Justice Gorsuch suggested that the Court might set aside the broader question of how much underperformance ever matters.
Justice Barrett asked whether deciding if an apple is an apple necessarily requires criteria. She suggested that Petitioners were in fact agreeing that a meaningful benchmark standard is appropriate and disputing only what counts as meaningful. She asked Respondents whether the Court could simply answer the question presented “Yes, period.” She also asked whether defining “meaningful” as “like aims and strategies” might lead lower courts to look for a twin.
Justice Kavanaugh pointed out that half of all funds will perform below the median, and also suggested that the case is really about whether using hedge funds in a risk-mitigation strategy was reasonable, noting that hedge funds are commonly used by funds seeking to mitigate risk.
Ultimately, the questioning suggested that the Court is likely to affirm the Ninth Circuit and hold that, when a claim rests on underperformance, the plaintiff must allege a meaningful benchmark. Justices across the bench described the comparison requirement in similar terms, including Thomas, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Kagan called the Ninth Circuit’s decision “a pretty reasonable decision.” Much of the later questioning concerned how to write the opinion, including how much guidance to give and how to define “meaningful.”
The scope of the opinion remains the main wild card. Justice Kagan and, to some extent, Justice Sotomayor seemed interested in saying that “meaningfully similar” does not mean “identical,” and that a comparator need not have the same asset allocation. Respondents and the government said they would not object to that guidance. Justice Gorsuch seemed to prefer a narrower ruling that leaves aside how much underperformance can ever matter. He also wanted the opinion to make clear that plaintiffs may plead imprudence in other ways. Regardless of how broadly the Court writes, a ruling for Intel could still leave room for plan participants who plead strategy-based claims, or who can successfully compare their plan’s funds to funds with similar goals.
[1] https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/31/2026-06178/fiduciary-duties-in-selecting-designated-investment-alternatives.
[2] Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409 (2014); Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc., 608 U.S. ___ (2026).
Overview of Cases Being Followed from 2026-27 Term
Anderson v. Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee
Relevant to employers who sponsor 401(k)s and the fiduciaries who manage them.
Oral Argument Analysis
On October 6, the Supreme Court held oral argument in Anderson v. Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee, No. 25-498. The case arises under ERISA’s duty of prudence. Petitioners’ theory is that Intel’s fiduciaries overallocated the plan’s target-date funds and a global diversified fund to hedge funds and private equity. Intel answered that it adopted that approach to reduce exposure to losses, at the acknowledged expense of some potential upside. The core issue in this case, as Justice Gorsuch paraphrased it, is whether, “for claims predicated on fund underperformance, a meaningful benchmark is required.” The U.S. Department of Labor recently included the following definition of “meaningful benchmark” in a proposed ERISA safe harbor for investment funds that include alternative assets, like hedge funds and private equity investments: “an investment, strategy, index, or other comparator that has similar mandates, strategies, objectives, and risks to the designed investment alternative.”[1]
Petitioners argued that ERISA’s duty of prudence is “inherently flexible” and that the Court has consistently declined to impose judicially crafted bright-line rules at the pleading stage. In their view, the Ninth Circuit’s “meaningful benchmark requirement” is such a rule because it requires a complaint to identify a virtually indistinguishable fund that performed better, failing which the performance allegations are discarded. That approach, petitioners argued, conflicts with Twombly and Iqbal, which require courts to assess all non-conclusory allegations together, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Respondents answered that much of Petitioners’ argument had little to do with the question presented, arguing that ERISA permits fiduciaries a wide range of prudent decisions, including the choice of a more conservative strategy. On the pleading question, Respondent argued that a performance gap alone does not plausibly suggest wrongdoing, because the obvious alternative explanation is that different funds are designed to perform differently. Respondent noted that the Court regularly draws clear lines at the pleading stage, as it did in Twombly, Dudenhoeffer, and Hikma.[2]
The United States supported Respondents, contending that to support an inference of imprudent implementation, Petitioners must compare Intel’s funds to funds with similar objectives.
Most of the justices seemed skeptical of Petitioners’ position. Justice Thomas opened by asking whether Petitioners were claiming that imprudence could be shown by comparing dissimilar funds, summarizing the Ninth Circuit’s point as “you can’t compare apples and oranges.” Petitioners agreed, but noted the real question is what counts as an apple and what counts as an orange. That metaphor framed much of the remaining argument.
Justice Gorsuch repeatedly returned Petitioners to the question presented. He asked whether Petitioners were shifting ground by effectively conceding that apples must be compared to apples while emphasizing the rest of the complaint. Justice Alito noted that Petitioners’ brief focused heavily on criticizing the investment strategy, which he said sounded like a challenge to strategy rather than underperformance. He also questioned how the strategy and underperformance arguments fit together under a “holistic” approach. Justice Gorsuch suggested that the Court might set aside the broader question of how much underperformance ever matters.
Justice Barrett asked whether deciding if an apple is an apple necessarily requires criteria. She suggested that Petitioners were in fact agreeing that a meaningful benchmark standard is appropriate and disputing only what counts as meaningful. She asked Respondents whether the Court could simply answer the question presented “Yes, period.” She also asked whether defining “meaningful” as “like aims and strategies” might lead lower courts to look for a twin.
Justice Kavanaugh pointed out that half of all funds will perform below the median, and also suggested that the case is really about whether using hedge funds in a risk-mitigation strategy was reasonable, noting that hedge funds are commonly used by funds seeking to mitigate risk.
Ultimately, the questioning suggested that the Court is likely to affirm the Ninth Circuit and hold that, when a claim rests on underperformance, the plaintiff must allege a meaningful benchmark. Justices across the bench described the comparison requirement in similar terms, including Thomas, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Kagan called the Ninth Circuit’s decision “a pretty reasonable decision.” Much of the later questioning concerned how to write the opinion, including how much guidance to give and how to define “meaningful.”
The scope of the opinion remains the main wild card. Justice Kagan and, to some extent, Justice Sotomayor seemed interested in saying that “meaningfully similar” does not mean “identical,” and that a comparator need not have the same asset allocation. Respondents and the government said they would not object to that guidance. Justice Gorsuch seemed to prefer a narrower ruling that leaves aside how much underperformance can ever matter. He also wanted the opinion to make clear that plaintiffs may plead imprudence in other ways. Regardless of how broadly the Court writes, a ruling for Intel could still leave room for plan participants who plead strategy-based claims, or who can successfully compare their plan’s funds to funds with similar goals.
[1] https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/31/2026-06178/fiduciary-duties-in-selecting-designated-investment-alternatives.
[2] Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409 (2014); Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc., 608 U.S. ___ (2026).
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Anderson v. Intel is likely to affect any employer who sponsors 401(k)s, the fiduciaries who manage them, and the employees that utilize those plans. The case focuses on plan fiduciaries’ selection of assets and how to assess whether the assets selected are underperforming. When a complaint says fiduciaries chose an underperforming investment, must it identify a “meaningful benchmark,” meaning a truly comparable fund with similar aims and risks, to survive a motion to dismiss? The 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Circuits say yes, while the 6th Circuit says no. If the Court requires a meaningful benchmark, pleadings would be subject to more scrutiny at an early stage. That would likely cut down on performance-based suits, and some argue it would increase employers’ willingness to offer plans in the first place. If the Court rejects the requirement, more of these claims could reach discovery and beyond. Those advocating for no identification of a “meaningful benchmark” say that would strengthen participants’ access to court, while the defense bar warns it would increase litigation costs and settlement pressure across the retirement-plan system.
Apple, Inc. v. Epic Games, Inc.
Of interest to those who routinely litigate matters that result in injunctions.
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Anyone who litigates under or against an injunction should keep an eye on Apple Inc. v. Epic Games, Inc. In 2021, a federal court barred Apple from stopping developers from adding buttons, links, or other “calls to action” that send users to payment options outside Apple’s in-app system. Apple then allowed outside links but charged a new 27% commission on purchases made through them, along with design restrictions and warning “scare screens.” The district court held Apple in civil contempt and found that the commission made every alternative “economically non-viable.” The case asks whether a court can hold a party in contempt for violating an injunction’s “spirit” when the order says nothing about the conduct at issue. If the Court upholds strict enforcement of injunctions based on the text, parties bound by an injunction could face contempt only for conduct an order clearly and specifically forbids, and courts’ power to grant relief that reaches beyond the parties could narrow. If the Court upholds a broader reading of an injunction, courts would have a clearer ability to punish efforts “designed to defeat” an order that are not expressly stated in an injunction. Follow this case if you routinely represent clients in areas prone to injunctions (including intellectual property, restrictive covenants in employment agreements, anti-competition, complex commercial disputes, or real estate law).
Crowther v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia
Will address whether employees of federally funded state educational institutions may sue for sex-based employment discrimination under Title IX
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In Crowther v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, the Supreme Court will decide whether employees of federally funded state educational institutions may sue for sex-based employment discrimination under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. The issue traces back to the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005), which held that an employee who alleged retaliation for complaining about sex discrimination against students could bring a claim under Title IX. What Jackson left open – and what Crowther is expected to address – is whether Title IX also reaches employees who allege that they themselves experienced sex discrimination, or whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which already provides a private right of action for employment discrimination, forecloses that reading.
RiseandShine Corporation v. PepsiCo, Inc.
Relevant to trademark holders and will address whether the inherent strength of a trademark is a question of fact or a question of law
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This case will address an important aspect of trademark law: is the inherent strength of a trademark a question of fact for the jury, or a question of law for the court?
Rise Brewing Co. has sold nitro cold brew coffee under its RISE marks since 2014. In March 2021, PepsiCo launched “MTN DEW RISE ENERGY,” a canned energy drink displaying the word “RISE” in capital letters across the top of upper portion of the can. Rise Brewing sued PepsiCo, alleging trademark infringement.
Most circuits treat where a mark falls on the spectrum of distinctiveness (generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful) as a question of fact. The Second Circuit is the only circuit that treats a mark’s inherent strength as a question of law. That framework let the district court hold the RISE marks weak “as a matter of law,” which cleared the way for summary judgment in PepsiCo’s favor. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will resolve who determines the inherent strength of a trademark—the court or a jury.
If the Court holds that a mark’s strength is a question for the finder of fact, juries and trial courts will play a larger role in deciding it, and summary judgment may be harder to obtain when the consumer-perception evidence is genuinely disputed. The path to a decision, then, will be more lengthy and more costly for the litigations. If the Court instead holds that this is a question of law, courts of appeals could apply a uniform legal standard within each circuit, which would promote consistency and allow trademark disputes to be resolved earlier, and at less cost.
Salazar v. Paramount Global
Of interest to those who offer audiovisual content and services online in conjunction with other services and utilize tracking technologies
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This case will not only resolve an outstanding circuit split, but will provide insight into this Court’s preferred methods and canons of statutory interpretation as applied to the timely issue of privacy in the digital age.
The Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”) imposes liability for a “video tape service provider who knowingly discloses, to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider.” It defines “consumer” as “any renter, purchaser, or subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider,” and “video tape service provider” as a person engaged in the business of “rental, sale, or delivery of pre-recorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual materials.”
Michael Salazar is urging the Supreme Court to adopt a privacy-enlarging interpretation of these terms. Salazar alleges that he subscribed to 247Sports.com’s newsletter in 2022 and viewed videos on its website. He claims that Paramount tracked his viewing history and disclosed it to Facebook. The Sixth Circuit held that he did not qualify as a consumer under the VPPA because he subscribed to a newsletter rather than audio visual content—even though he watched videos on the provider’s website. In departing from the Second and Seventh Circuits’ holdings on the same issue, the Sixth Circuit used the context of the phrase “goods and services” to conclude that the VPPA only protects those who have rented, purchased, or subscribed to audiovisual materials. Whichever of these interpretations the Supreme Court favors, its latest approach to statutory interpretation will be on full display.
Suncor Energy Inc. v. County Commissioners of Boulder County
Will address whether federal law bars state-law claims that seek relief for injuries allegedly caused by greenhouse-gas emissions and their effects on the global climate
Oral Argument Analysis
On October 5, the Supreme Court held oral argument in Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commissioners of Boulder County. The case asks whether local governments may use state tort law to hold fossil-fuel producers liable for harms tied to global climate change.
The core issue in this case is whether federal law preempts Boulder's state-law claims against Suncor and Exxon Mobil. Boulder's theory is that the companies' worldwide conduct increased the use of fossil fuels, which raised greenhouse-gas emissions, which contributed to climate change, which in turn harmed Boulder.
While individual states’ ability to regulate point sources of emissions under the source state’s law has long been recognized, Boulder’s theory does not cleanly fall under that area of permissible state regulation because it targets producers rather than “emitters” of greenhouse gases and the county is trying to hold them liable for their role in causing harm in one state based on their indirect contributions to climate change.
Suncor and Exxon Mobil argued that this crossed the line into exclusive federal jurisdiction under the Clean Air Act, but the Colorado Supreme Court rejected the companies' federal preemption defenses. Petitioners offered three grounds for reversal:
- The constitutional structure makes interstate pollution an inherently federal area.
- The Constitution forbids a state from regulating out-of-state conduct based on attenuated in-state effects.
- The Clean Air Act independently preempts the claims.
Boulder answered that states have always been able to provide tort remedies for in-state injuries caused by out-of-state conduct. It also argued that some of its claims are not preempted because they target conduct the Clean Air Act does not regulate, such as Petitioners' alleged “deception” about how fossil-fuel products affect climate change.
At oral argument, several justices seemed open to reversal. Justice Kavanaugh pointed out that Supreme Court precedent already makes "crystal clear” that interstate air and water pollution are matters for federal law unless Congress specifically states otherwise. Chief Justice Roberts asked whether Boulder's focus on fuel production, rather than emissions, was an attempt to evade those precedents. Justice Barrett largely accepted that interstate pollution is "an enclave of federal common law." She described the Clean Air Act's saving clause as preserving a limited area of state authority rather than broadly authorizing state regulation in this area.
Other justices pushed back on Petitioners' theories. Justice Sotomayor stressed that the Clean Air Act does not address fuel marketing or production, which suggests that she sees room for state law to reach that conduct. Justice Kagan doubted that the Constitution bars states from regulating interstate pollution, although she suggested that the Clean Air Act itself might preempt Boulder’s claims. In her view, Boulder's claims depend on the premise that the companies caused excessive emissions, and the Act sets up the scheme for deciding which emissions are excessive. Boulder noted in response that the EPA has disclaimed authority to regulate greenhouse gases pursuant to the Clean Air Act. Justice Gorsuch focused on a related problem: if EPA lacks authority to regulate greenhouse gases, he asked, would the Clean Air Act leave a gap in which nobody can sue at all?
Several justices also raised concerns about the practical limits of Boulder's theory of state regulation. Chief Justice Roberts asked how things would work out if municipalities in every state copied Boulder's pleadings. Justice Thomas asked whether anything would stop plaintiffs from suing large retailers, and Boulder's counsel conceded that nothing in Boulder's theory would. Justice Kavanaugh noted that an expert agency is better equipped than judges to set emissions policy, and he suggested the same reasoning applies to "a six-person state jury in Boulder." Boulder pointed to other limits on liability, including choice-of-law constraints, the dormant Commerce Clause, personal jurisdiction, and proximate cause, which would be addressed later in the litigation.
Several justices also raised questions about jurisdiction, which could give the Court an off-ramp. The Court can hear this interlocutory appeal only if the Colorado Supreme Court's ruling was a "self-contained" original proceeding. Justice Jackson suggested the case was premature because other federal defenses remain pending in state court. Petitioners urged the Court to answer the question "sooner rather than later" given the dozens of similar lawsuits pending across the country.
Ultimately, the questioning suggested that a majority may be prepared to reverse, likely by relying on the Court's existing interstate-pollution precedents. The jurisdictional questions and the separate treatment of Boulder's deception claims remain wild cards. And a late-breaking recusal by Justice Alito could yield a 4-4 vote, resulting in an affirmance by an equally divided Court.
Regardless of how this case is decided, it is expected to have significant consequences for energy producers’ exposure to climate-related tort liability nationwide.
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In Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commissioners of Boulder County, the Court will decide whether federal law bars state-law claims that seek relief for injuries allegedly caused by greenhouse-gas emissions and their effects on the global climate.
The City of Boulder and Boulder County sued Suncor and ExxonMobil in Colorado state court. They brought claims for public nuisance, private nuisance, trespass, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy, and they seek billions of dollars for past and future climate-change harms. While the Supreme Court has long treated interstate pollution as an inherently federal area that federal law governs, the Colorado Supreme Court held in 2025 that the Clean Air Act displaced federal common law in this area and that state law therefore applies unless the Act itself preempts the claims. That court found no preemption and allowed Boulder’s claims to proceed. That ruling expressly departs from the Second Circuit’s 2021 decision in City of New York v. Chevron Corp., which held that displacing federal common law does not revive state-law claims over global emissions, and deepens a growing split of authority between state and federal courts on this issue.
The Court’s decision will have a major effect on climate-change litigation and the energy industry nationwide. If the Court affirms, these suits could go forward in state courts across the country. Energy producers would then face liability under a patchwork of local standards, set by juries applying the law of each forum. If the Court reverses, it would likely end Boulder’s suit and close the door to state-law climate claims based on out-of-state emissions. Climate policy-making would be reserved for wthe federal political branches and the Clean Air Act’s regulatory scheme. However, the Court has also independently raised the issue of whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case at all. This means that the Court could decline to decide the federal preemption question altogether, which would deprive both sides of this dispute with the needed guidance this case could otherwise provide.
International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc. v. Ferguson
Of interest to those who litigate issues involving parental rights, education policies, health-care decisions, and other disputes involving government regulation of family relationships.
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In International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc. v. Ferguson, the Supreme Court will consider whether parents and advocacy organizations have standing to challenge Washington laws governing runaway minors who seek gender-affirming or other protected health-care services. The challenged laws modify Washington’s procedures for responding to certain runaway youth by requiring licensed shelters to notify the state’s Department of Children, Youth, and Families, rather than parents directly, when a minor seeks protected health-care services. The Department must then attempt to notify parents and offer family-reconciliation and behavioral-health services.
Petitioners contend these laws interfere with parents’ constitutional rights to direct the upbringing and medical care of their children, while Washington argues that the laws do not infringe those rights and that the plaintiffs have not suffered a concrete or imminent injury sufficient to bring suit in federal court.
Although the underlying dispute concerns parental rights and gender-affirming care for minors, the case could have broader implications for Article III standing doctrine. The Court’s decision may clarify when individuals can bring pre-enforcement constitutional challenges based on anticipated future harms and could affect litigation involving parental rights, education policies, health-care decisions, and other disputes involving government regulation of family relationships.
St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy
One of the most closely watched cases of the term; will address whether religious schools are entitled to religious exemptions from nondiscrimination laws that bar discrimination against LGBTQ children and parents
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This case, one of the most closely watched of the term, addresses whether religious schools are entitled to religious exemptions to nondiscrimination laws that bar discrimination against LGBTQ children and parents.
In 2020, Colorado established a universal preschool program (“UPK”), in which families in the state could receive 15 hours of free preschool per week at participating schools. To be part of the UPK, and thereby receive government funding, preschools were required to sign a nondiscrimination agreement, agreeing to provide all children an “equal opportunity” to enroll “regardless of race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity, lack of housing, income level, or disability.” Two Catholic preschools challenged the legality of this nondiscrimination agreement because they sought to continue their policy of turning away LGBTQ children and LGBTQ parents, in accordance with the preschools’ Catholic beliefs. The preschools argue that the nondiscrimination agreement infringes upon their free exercise of religion, in violation of the First Amendment.
As part of its decision the Court will address whether Carson v. Makin, in which the Court held that a state’s explicit restriction on religious schools participating in a state funding scheme was unconstitutional, only applies when the government explicitly, instead of implicitly, excludes religious schools.
Note that the Court declined the petitioner’s request to reconsider Employment Division v. Smith, the longstanding Scalia decision holding that neutral laws of general applicability survive First Amendment scrutiny despite incident burdens on religious practices (there, consumption of peyote during religious ceremonies). Although the decision will not overrule Smith, it will almost certainly provide new guidance on how the Smith rule is to be applied.
Grand v. City of University Heights
Of interest to those who deal with First Amendment issues in the context of regulations applicable to religious practices
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If you host a prayer group, Bible study, or other religious gathering in your home, or you advise the municipalities that regulate permitted uses of homes, Grand v. City of University Heights is worth following. An Orthodox Jewish resident of a Cleveland suburb wanted to host a minyan (a prayer quorum of at least ten men) in one room of his house. Within hours of a neighbor’s complaint, he received a cease-and-desist letter warning that he could face code citations and “additional remedies.” He applied for a special use permit and later withdrew the application. Both the federal district court and the Sixth Circuit then dismissed his religious-freedom claims as not ripe, because the City had never issued a final zoning decision. Grand’s petition to the Supreme Court asks a narrow procedural question. Under the First Amendment, a credible government threat that discourages someone from exercising a right can itself count as an injury, even before any enforcement. Should that rule give way to the “finality” requirement borrowed from land-use takings cases, which makes property owners wait for a final zoning decision before suing? If the Justices side with Grand, people of faith could challenge threatening municipal orders in federal court right away instead of first working through local zoning procedures. Grand’s petition argues that this will matter more over time as more Americans age in place and more houses of worship close. A ruling for the City would confirm that, in at least some circuits, residents must generally wait for a final local decision before suing.
Viramontes v. Cook County & Grant v. Higgins
Relevant to government entities that regulate access to firearms and address whether access to assault style rifles can be prohibited
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In the consolidated cases of Viramontes v. Cook County and Grant v. Higgins, the United States Supreme Court will hear two challenges to the constitutionality of bans on AR-15s and other semiautomatic rifles.
Both Cook County and Connecticut enacted bans on the sale, transfer, or possession of “assault weapons.” In defining “assault weapons,” both bans enumerate specific rifles and common features, including “copies or duplicates thereof.”
In each case, petitioners have argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and Bruen necessitate a finding that AR-15 platform and similar semiautomatic rifles are protected arms that cannot be banned consistent with the Second Amendment. Specifically, AR-15 platform rifles, and other semiautomatics, are arms in “common use” as articulated by Heller.
Eyes will be on the Supreme Court as its decision has lasting implications for AR-15 and semiautomatic rifle owners across the United States. If the Court’s prior Second Amendment jurisprudence is any indication, the decision will also showcase the text-and-history interpretive framework most recently articulated in Bruen (2022) and Wolford (2026).
For cases from the 2025-26 Supreme Court Term, click here.